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Abstract 
The implementation of Better Buying Power policies seeks to achieve affordability across the 
spectrum of major defense acquisition programs. However, the technical and programmatic 
challenges associated with sequential decision-making in the acquisition of large scale, 
increasingly interdependent defense systems prompts a need for quantitative frameworks 
that can better address the complexities of negotiating capability, schedule, and cost, while 
fulfilling target objectives of affordability. Our proposed research extends prior funded work 
and adopts innovations from financial engineering to enable quantitatively informed multi-
stage decision-making under uncertainty. The method provides a means of assessing 
tradeoffs between capability, cost, and schedule risks, and the ability to objectively make 
sequentially dependent acquisition decisions on a “portfolio” of systems, towards some 
desired overarching capability. We adopt a dynamic programming approach using statistical 
measures and optimization techniques that balance short term decisions against long term 
implications on dimensions of cost, risk, and schedule. The method is demonstrated for the 
concept case of multi-stage acquisitions in a naval acquisition scenario. 
Introduction 
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has emphasized a need for Better Buying 
Power (BBP) initiatives in tackling issues of increasing costs, schedule growth and 
programmatic failures. Dr. Ashton Carter, under secretary of defense for acquisitions, 
technology and logistics, in a series of memo issues, has called for a need for “Should Cost” 
policies to promote affordability in defense acquisitions. “Should Cost” policies involve a 
practical approach to reducing costs of defense portfolios through targeting of cost growths, 
incentivizing productivity and innovation, reducing redundant processes, promotion of real 
competition and improvement of tradecraft in acquisition of services. The spirit of the move 
towards affordability is to promote the identification and acquisition of sensible technologies 
(or programs) at an acceptable cost and at minimum schedule risk. Policy levers (e.g., 
incentivized contracting) are used to promote innovation, while at the same time, reducing 
cost growths and redundancies in the capabilities of the warfighter portfolio. The reduction in 
technical and programmatic redundancies is in line with the U.S. military’s vision of 
promoting adaptability and resilience in capabilities where systems and assets can adapt, 
through reconnections and redeployment of existing assets, towards meeting the needs of a 
changing warfighter scenario.  
Additionally, there have been significant efforts in promoting competitive innovation 
through Open Architecture (OA) and rapid prototyping initiatives. OA establishes set 
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standards that enable the leveraging of technological innovations, with emphasis on Small 
Business Innovation research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) 
mechanisms that can readily interface with existing platforms, based on set interface 
standards. More specifically, OA involves the design and implementation of systems that 
conform to a common and unified set of technical interfaces and business standards. This 
form of “open architecture” tests and broadens potential innovations to a much larger scope 
than traditional acquisition processes. Rapid prototyping complements efforts such as the 
OA to enable rapid proof-of-concept testing and fielding in warfighter test environments. 
Rapid prototyping and testing of new, yet-to-be introduced systems naturally provides 
objective information on the potential operational value of individual systems early on in the 
platform lifecycle.  
The current needs of the U.S. military still challenges the effectiveness of BBP 
policies in acquiring “capabilities” rather than localized acquisition of an individual system. 
The acquisition of “capabilities,” through Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs), 
presents unique complexities that exist between yet-to-be acquired and existing system 
capabilities. BBP policies, OA and rapid prototyping are examples of policies that serve to 
determine the value of yet-to-be introduced systems. However, these serve as general 
guidelines and cannot deal with the technical and programmatic complexities of the 
overarching collection of systems or “system of systems” as a whole that contribute 
collectively to a desired capability. Furthermore, the decision-spaces associated with 
evaluating the connectivity, capabilities and development schedule impacts under 
uncertainty, can involve a large number of variables that can often go beyond the immediate 
mental faculties of the decision-maker. The problem in size of the decision space 
exacerbates the difficulty of decision-making in situations where early on acquisition 
decisions can have an impact on subsequent decision-epochs of an acquisition strategy. 
The current guidelines in the DoD Acquisitions Guidebook (DAG), and the DoD System of 
Systems Engineering (SoSE) Guidebook do not provide distinct methodologies in managing 
the quantitative complexities that can manifest across technical and programmatic 
dimensions of development. The need for necessary quantitative tools in support of evolving 
the U.S. military’s desired portfolio of capabilities, while negotiating the dimensions of cost, 
risk and schedule in a multi-epoch setting, motivates our body of research. 
Affordability: An Investment Portfolio Perspective  
Affordability is not a static notion—the tenets of affordability demand a constant 
enforcement of policies throughout the evolutionary path of developing defense capabilities 
and requires that selection of investments be made based on what is deemed as sensible. 
Here, sensible more specifically refers to identifying investments in programs/systems that 
justify theirs risks and can achieve the capabilities required based on the finite boundaries of 
allocated budget. The sequential nature of decision-making, in the management of MDAPs, 
bears much semblance to the practice of the multi-period portfolio problem in finance where 
portfolio managers sequentially adjust the positions of their highly populated portfolios, in an 
effort of maximizing profit, under conditions of market uncertainty. The financial portfolios 
are subject to market uncertainties, transaction costs of portfolio adjustments, and 
constrained by various investment rules that dictate compatibility policies, risk limits and 
capital limits as well. Portfolio management techniques have been employed in the strategic 
management of military acquisitions. Prior works include application of Real Options (RO) 
theory (Giachetti, 2012; Mun, 2005) to map potential investment options as distinct branches 
of a decision-tree. Work by (Giachetti, 2012) has adopted a real options framework that 
utilizes stochastic techniques to managing military investments. Work by (Mun, 2005) 
establishes an eight phase process to addressing portfolio management of strategic assets 
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and has been applied in corporate environments. Prior research, funded by the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) and presented at the 2012 NPS Acquisition Research 
Symposium (Davendralingam, 2012), has focused on a robust portfolio management 
problem of maximizing a warfighter system of systems portfolio performance index while 
preserving budgetary and compatibility constraints of underlying military assets. Risks and 
capabilities stemming from inter-system interdependencies span the functional and physical 
spaces of the system of systems architecture. The developed strategy supports acquisitions, 
both in the pre- and post- milestone B phases in improving affordability and BBP objectives 
while considering evolving military requirements.  
The work has been subsequently extended (Davendralingam, 2013) to a multi-stage 
robust portfolio management problem in which a warfighter performance index for a large 
collection of systems or “System of Systems (SoS),” is maximized while leveraging the 
potential gains in overall SoS capability against cost and developmental risks in selecting 
“baskets” of functionally and physically compatible, interdependent systems. The method 
utilizes robust optimization techniques developed by Bertsimas (Bertsimas, 2004, 2008) to 
address correlated data uncertainties that may exist over the strategic horizon. However, the 
implementation only considers static correlation over the entire strategic horizon—a notion 
that may be very difficult to accurately ascertain, and may not yield insights in tactical 
aspects in defense acquisition decision-making. 
Our current research extends this framework to include a more tactically effective 
representation of system level objectives (and constraints) that are reflective of cost, 
capability and schedule, within a dynamic optimization framework. The representation can 
better capture investment issues such as deciding between building upon legacy 
architectures or developing new ones, consideration for reduced costs due to competition 
effects, and leveraging advantages from open architecture policies. Additionally, the method 
includes statistical measure updates that reflect transitional risks, and consequent 
dependencies that acquisitions decisions have on propagating risks. Our framework seeks 
to reduce the complexities associated with the large dimensional tradespace of managing 
portfolios of systems to a more manageable set of adjustable performance/risk driven 
parameters within the context of a computational acquisitions support tool. 
Evolving Capabilities in Defence Acquisitions  
Military capabilities arise out of the hierarchical structure of translating localized 
capabilities of interconnected systems, to the metrics of what constitutes a suite of 
overarching capabilities. Figure 1 illustrates this hierarchical arrangement of systems that 
collectively constitute a system of systems architecture. Here, systems that serve at various 
levels of operational hierarchy (from α to ϒ level) are in turn, operationally connected to 
other systems that may come under control of different managerial authorities. The 
cooperative dynamics of these masses of systems, in turn satisfy requirements (such as 
ability to execute mission threads and achieve defined capabilities) that translate to the 
capability of the system of systems architecture as a whole. Changes (adding, removing, 
upgrading, retiring, etc.) of individual systems can potentially lead to either beneficial or 
deleterious repercussions on the overall system of systems as a whole, and is therefore 
dependent on judicious execution of proposed changes. These changes are regularly 
executed in piece meal fashion (localized) with minimal consideration to the systems of 
systems as a whole; the localization is in part due to the absence of technical decision-
making frameworks that can better assist acquisition practitioners in making better informed 
decision on acquisitions, and their impact on the picture as a whole. 
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 Hierarchy and Transition of Systems to System of Systems (SoS) 
Capabilities 
Figure 2 is an abstraction of the evolutionary aspects of a “portfolio of systems,” and 
is captured through the Wave model (Dahmann, 2011). The Wave model extends the 
Department of Defense guidelines on systems engineering (SE) for a system of systems 
(SoS) that translates SoS SE core elements, interrelationships and decision-making artifacts 
from a previous “Trapeze” model to a time sequenced model representation (Dahmann, 
2011). 
 
 Wave Model Relation to Portfolio Evolution 
These architectural evolutions involve acquisition based decisions (add, remove, 
etc.) on assets, towards meeting core objectives. The practitioner’s role is therefore to 
explore the trade space across multiple operationally independent domains, and perform 
necessary acquisition decisions that support desired capability objectives while limiting cost 
to a prescribed finite budget, assessing feasibility of development schedule and limiting 
foreseeable risks. 
The objective of the multi-period portfolio framework in our research is to allow for 
mathematical rigor of algorithmic techniques (transparent to the end user/acquisition 
practitioner), to support acquisition decisions through identification of optimal “portfolios” and 
acquisition policies in pursuit of desired capabilities. While the acquisition process spans 
operationally and managerially independent defense groups, the tools and frameworks 
envisioned to support these aspects are aimed at providing adequate quantitative support of 
trades-pace insights. These explorations require a domain agnostic framework, and hence 
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intuitively resonate with the idea of treating the collection of systems across domains as a 
“portfolio” of systems. Our work extends the prior robust formulation to also yield more 
tactical acquisition insights at each decision epoch of acquisitions. 
Developing a Multi-Period Strategy With Tactical Updates 
Acquisition decisions on existing and yet-to-be introduced systems, in an evolving a 
system of systems, inherently involves a timeline of sequentially executed decisions. We 
enforce a representative, domain independent model that describes node (system) 
attributes. These attributes reflect feasibility of constructed portfolios with respect to 
technical and programmatic constraints. Figure 3 shows modeled generic behaviors for 
systems being considered in a system of systems portfolio (Davendralingam, 2013). 
System of Systems Modelling 
 
 Archetypal Node (System) Behaviors 
In Figure 3, the capabilities of an existing system of systems (initial blue nodes), 
have the potential to evolve, based on potential connections to yet-to-be acquired systems 
(dashed lines and nodes). At each decision epoch, the practitioner utilizes a decision-
making framework to evaluate the value and risks involved in the potential acquisitions of 
new systems (denoted by red dashed lines). Evaluation of such information can potentially 
come from prototyping/test and fielding results, or other such information seeking/risk 
reducing acquisition actions. The resulting new collection of systems that comprise the new 
portfolio, now include the addition of the new systems and identifies appropriate decision-
paths that are necessary to achieve the target collection of systems. Our current research 
explores the incorporation of tactical information at each update, to enable subsequent 
epoch decision-analysis using the portfolio based framework. The work enforces constraints 
on system selection where each system is treated as a generic discrete node with the 
following attributes: 
 Capability (Outputs): Nodes have finite supply of transmittable capabilities 
 Requirements (Inputs): Nodes have internal requirements that can be fulfilled 
by connecting to other nodes that can provide for the need. 
 Compatibility: Nodes can connect to other nodes based on specific 
combinatorial rules. 
The capabilities and requirements relationship between nodes can be binary in 
nature (yes/no) or reflect some numerical quantity between them. Additionally, there can be 
uncertainty in the quantified values, as is the case, for example, in acquisitions of systems 
with lower TRL numbers. 
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Investment Portfolio Formulation 
The acquisition problem is expressed as a mathematical programming problem. The 
process begins with the definition of two main elements of a mathematical program, namely, 
the objective function and constraints. The objective function reflects key performance 
metrics of the system to be maximized (or minimized). For a system of systems, the 
objective function reflects a chosen measure of performance. The second important aspect 
of a mathematical program is the formulation of the constraints. The constraints reflect 
physical, resource and behavioral aspects of the systems as mathematical expressions. Our 
preliminary framework for a multi-period portfolio considers a long term horizon of 
acquisitions with discrete decision epochs that reflect investment decisions. These decisions 
can involve acquisition actions such as the addition/removal of individual systems towards 
achieving a desired capability. 
The following mathematical program describes a preliminary framework towards the 
overall portfolio acquisition problem: 




    (1) 
Subject to: 
qc q qR q
q q
S x S x   (Satisfying each type (c) requirement) (2) 
ሺݔ௜൅. . ൅ݔ௡ሻ௝ ൌ ܯ௝ j=1…k     (package system compatibility)  (3) 




ܯݔ௤ െ ܴܶܮ௤ݔ௤ ൑ 0     (5) 
ܴܶܮ௤ݔ௤ െ ܯݔ௤ ൑ 0     (6) 
[0,1], [0,8]TRLq qx x   
8q TRLTRL   , 8q TRLCost    (Uncertain) 
Equation 1 is the weighted objective function that seeks to maximize the end 
developed portfolio performance index. Here, the index is weighted according to the 
normalized value that each capability (C) contributes to the index. The normalization is 
performed with reference to some minimum acceptable performance value for each 
capability, Rc. Equation 2 ensures that the total “capabilities” from selected systems are able 
to satisfy the requirements of connected systems that are in need of a particular capability. 
For example, there must be adequate communications bandwidth capability stemming from 
the selected communications assets, so as to enable performance of the weapons systems 
for the same naval asset. Equation 3 enforces compatibility constraints as binary conditions 
for a total of (k) set of rules; for example, the constraint that only one engine can be selected 
to generate power would translate to a constraint of x1 + x2 = 1 where (x1, x2) are binary 
variables. Equation 4 ensures that the costs of developing (in this case, the cost of 
promoting, via research, low Technology Readiness Level (TRL) technologies to an 
acceptable fielding level of TRL 8) and cost of acquisition are within a prescribed budget; 
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this is in line with the notion of affordability where finite resources are considered. Equations 
5 and 6 utilize a linear programming structure known as a Big-M approach to establish a 
logical expression; here the systems selected for the end deployment can only be of TRL 
level 8 and above.  
Equations 1–6 constitute the overarching investment problem where the objective is 
to select and end portfolio that maximizes a warfighter portfolio performance index (objective 
function) while preserving budget and feasibility constraints on the readiness of technologies 
that need to enter to the final portfolio. The final acquisition costs of yet-to-be introduced 
systems below a TRL level 8 and the final TRL status (TRLq) of researched systems are 
considered to be uncertain. These uncertainties intuitively have correlated properties as the 
development of technologies for interconnected systems, would likely benefit in some 
cooperative sense. We also assume that the TRLs and costs evolve as a product of 
research investment due to defense interests—this investment guided evolution is in line 
with current practices of proof of concept and rapid prototyping of potential technologies and 
services at various TRL levels. 
Dynamic Programming Overview 
The investment portfolio problem of Equations 1–6 is reflective of the need to 
maximize the end portfolio capabilities of a collection of systems that are governed by 
behavioural rules of connectivity and influenced by data uncertainty. Our prior multi-period 
portfolio work has approached the problem within the context of a robust optimization 
problem that utilized innovations in robust (correlated data) linear programming techniques 
(Bertsimas, 2004); the application of the method, however, is strategic in nature and 
depends on static correlations—a notion that may not hold true in dynamic defence 
acquisition environments. While the robust portfolio framework offers useful insights, there is 
nevertheless a need for a dynamic framework that can provide useful tactical timeline 
decision-making support, and, possess good long-term evolutionary performance.  
Acquisition decisions in earlier epochs typically have a cascading implications on the 
performance and risks in subsequent decisions; this form of a problem has long been 
address under the premise of dynamic programming. Dynamic programming has evolved 
out of many areas of research, ranging from economics to modern control theory (Powell, 
2011). The general form of a dynamic programming problem can be written as the following: 
௧ܸሺܵ௧ሻ ൌ max௫೟ ܥ௧ ሺܵ௧, ݔ௧ሻ ൅ ௧ܸାଵሺܵ௧ାଵሻ   (7) 
௧ܸሺܵ௧ሻ ൌ max௧ୀ଴ ሼߛ௧ܥ௧గሺܵ௧, ݔ௧గሺܵ௧ሻሽ     (8) 
where Ct() is the reward function of current time step 
S୲ is the current state 
x୲ is the action taken at time (T) 
V୲+1 is the value function of being in state S୲+1 
ϒ is a weighting constant, π is a set of all policies 
Equations 7 and 8 are the deterministic and stochastic representations of the 
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations. Typically, these are solved using backward 
recursion, over all possible states and seek a sequence of decisions (x୲) that maximize (or 
minimize) an objective function. The value of the objective is dictated by being in particular 
states (S୲) (here, a state, in the context of our acquisition problem, may be the overarching 
military value of current holdings of systems and their potential connections to future 
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systems). The traditional means of solving these equations backward in time can prove to 
be extremely expensive/difficult due to many reasons that include computational 
intractability (also known as the curse of dimensionality), absence of models for future states 
and dependency on data that does not yet exist. An alternative, and highly attractive 
practice in dealing with these kind of problems involves the use of Approximate Dynamic 
Programming (ADP) approach that essentially solve the problem in a forward dynamic 
programing approach (Powell, 2012; Bertsekas, 2011). In the context of a defence 
acquisition scenario, this is highly intuitive given that the structure of testing, prototyping, 
simulation, and so forth, presents new information in a forward sense, to help inform 
decision-makers in adjusting their portfolios of systems. Our research complements this 
forward view with our multi-period portfolio approach, using an ADP inspired methodology.  
Multi-Period Portfolio Optimization  
We formulate the investment portfolio problem (with uncertainty in TRL and cost) of 
Equations 1–6 as a forward dynamic programming problem where the objective is to 
sequentially update acquisition decisions as TRL and cost of potential, yet-to-be introduced 
system evolve over a discretized finite horizon. The resulting forward dynamic programming 
problem is then stated as 
8
, ,max  E
qc c qc cTRL p
q t q t
q c c
S R S R
w x w x
R R




qc q t qR q t
q q
S x S x   (Satisfying each type (c) requirement)   (10) 






Budget  q TRL
n
TRL R
q q t q t t
q
Cost x Cost x 












      (13) 
8
, , , 0   
TRL P
q t q t q tMx TRL x
       (14) 
8
, , , 0   
P TRL
q t q t q tTRL x Mx




q t q q tx x x
        (16) 
8
, , ,, , [0,1], [0,8]
TRL p R TRL
q t q t q t qx x x x






 Decision variable to acquire in system (q) at time (t) 
,
p
q tx Total portfolio of systems (q) at time (t) based on current value of capabilities 
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,
R
q tx Decision variable to invest in research for systems below TRL 8 (q) at time (t) 
Y discount term/belief term 
Equations 9 is the objective function that now seeks to balance the potential gains 
from investing in ready technologies at the current decision epoch, through investment 
decision variable (ݔ௤,௧்ோ௅வ଼), against the potential for future value in the overall portfolio of 
capabilities based on the decision variable (ݔ௤௣); note that the contribution of the potential 
future value is dependent on the maturity of a TRL level to exceed level 8. Equation 10 
enforces that system requirements of the end potential portfolio of systems are satisfied by 
capabilities from other connected systems. Equation 11 enforces compatibility constraints. 
Equation 12 ensures that combined piece-wise acquisitions of costs at the current decision-
epoch, and the cost of researching technologies below TRL 8. Equation 13 enforces the 
long-term budget satisfaction of the projected portfolio of systems. Equations 14–15 ensure 
that only TRL>8 systems can be acquired at each decision-epoch. Equation 16 establishes 
the relationship between decision-variables where decisions to research certain systems 
(ݔ௤,௧ோ ) and acquire mature ones (ݔ௤,௧்ோ௅வ଼) comprise the overall projected end portfolio of 
systems (ݔ௤௉) at the final decision epoch. The optimization problem of Equations 9–13 
constitute a Binary Integer Program (BIP) and was modeled using YALMIP (Löfberg, 2004) 
within the MATLAB environment (MATLAB 2010), using the Gurobi Optimizer (Gurobi 
Optimization, Inc. 2004), solver option. The optimization problem of Equations 9–13 is 
solved recursively over each investment decision epoch. At the end of each epoch, TRLs 
(and cost) of yet-to-be introduced systems are evolved to a new estimate, based on the prior 
epoch’s investment decision (ݔ௤,௧ோ ) in relevant technology. 
Concept Application: Naval Acquisition Scenario 
We apply our developed multi-stage portfolio framework for the case of a Naval 
Acquisition Scenario. The Naval Acquisition Scenario is based on the Littoral Combat Ship 
(LCS 2011) system model developed by Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics. The 
design of these ships allows for modular packages to be swapped for execution of a range 
of mission scenarios that include: Mine Counter Measure (MCM), Anti-Submarine Warfare 
(ASW) and Surface Warfare (SUW). Our simplified model consists of a hypothetical list of 
systems, listed in Table 1, that are available to the Navy for acquisition, and are presented 
with a corresponding Technology Readiness Levels (TRL). Although the number presented 
in the table are fictitious, the salient features of capability, requirements, cost and such, are 
represented. The (ASW, MCM, SUW, Unconventional Warfare) categories are the core 
mission packages, “Communications” represents the support communications systems 
available for deployment. Power represents the power generation systems available for 
deployment and in support of other systems.  
The first six columns show capabilities of each system, and their respective 
numerical valuations. Column 7 and 8 are the Power and Communications requirement 
needed for operation of the listed systems, in providing the respective capabilities in 
Columns 1–6. Column 9 is the acquisition cost of the relevant system, assuming a TRL level 
of 8 or above; for systems less than this, the number is subject to uncertainty. Column 10 is 
the cost of research at each time period to promote a particular system’s technology towards 
a TRL level 8—this can be thought of as a development cost.  
We apply the recursive framework of the forward dynamic programming problem as 
represented in Equations 9–16 to our Naval Acquisition Scenario where the need is to 
evolve and acquire systems towards maximizing warfighter capabilities. The solution of the 
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optimization at each decision epoch, assumes a value of “belief” in the future states, as 
dictated by the discount term ϒ that takes a value between 0 and 1 and is assumed to be set 
by the practitioner. The result of the optimization problem, at each decision epoch, 
generates a list of systems acquired at the time step (ݔ௤,௧்ோ௅வ଼) which are then also included 
as existing systems in the subsequent epoch. Solution of the optimization problem also 
generates a list of systems to be researched as denoted by variable (ݔ௤,௧ோ ), that are then 
subject to a simulated dynamics of TRL evolution due to research investment; the evolution 
also generates a new cost of acquisition estimate for the researched systems as well. 




The forward optimization scheme of Equations 9–16 is solved over six decision 
epochs, and using a choice of two levels of belief (how much to favour TRL>8 systems in 
each epoch over research investment) are captured in Table 2 and Table 3. Table 2 lists, for 
each degree of belief (Y = 1, 0.1), the acquisition of systems of TRL>8 at each decision 
epoch. A belief level of Y =1 refers to a high preference policy on potentially investing in 
systems of higher value that may need research funding (TRL investment). A belief value of 
Y = 0.1 refers to the converse where the policy is to invest in assets that are more readily 
available at the immediate decision epoch. It is assumes that for each value of Y used, we 
assume a constant value throughout the decision epochs. In realistic settings however, the 
values of Y can be adapted at each decision epoch; this process can either be through the 
practitioner’s insights or based on algorithmic rigor. Table 3 captures the research decisions 
(investment in system to potentially upgrade TRL) towards subsequent acquisition of the 
relevant system. 
The results of Table 2 are intuitive; using a high preference value of Y = 1.0, we can 
observe that the recursive optimization scheme does not invest in immediate systems at the 
System Weapon  Weapon Surface  Anti Mine Unconv Comm. Power Power Comm. Cost of  Cost of  TRL
Module Package Strike Detection  Detection Warfare Capacity Capacity Req. Bandwidth Acquisition Research
Range Range Range Payload Req.
(miles) (miles) (miles) (kg) (Mbps) (kW) (kW) (Mbps) (USD) (USD)
ASW Variable Depth 0 30 0 0 0 0 50 75 80000 20000 8
Multi Fcn Tow 0 40 0 0 0 0 100 125 90000 22500 6
Lightweight tow 0 50 0 0 0 0 150 150 100000 25000 6
ASW Prototype 1 0 60 0 0 0 0 175 150 120000 30000 7
ASW Prototype 2 0 70 0 0 0 0 180 100 130000 32500 7
MCM RAMCS II 0 0 30 0 0 0 100 75 80000 20000 8
ALMDS (MH‐60) 0 0 40 0 0 0 150 125 90000 22500 7
MCM Prototype 1 0 0 50 0 0 0 200 150 100000 25000 7
MCM Prototype 2 0 0 60 0 0 0 250 175 120000 30000 7
MCM Prototype 3 0 0 70 0 0 0 270 185 140000 35000 7
SUW N‐LOS Missiles 3 0 0 0 0 0 150 100 80000 20000 8
Griffin Missiles 25 0 0 0 0 0 200 200 90000 22500 7
SUW Prototype  1 50 0 0 0 0 0 250 300 100000 25000 7
SUW Prototype  2 60 0 0 0 0 0 200 120 120000 30000 6
SUW Prototype  3 70 0 0 0 0 0 200 300 130000 32500 6
Unconventional Package System 1  0 0 0 100 0 0 25 50 70000 17500 8
Warfare Package System 2 0 0 0 150 0 0 50 150 80000 20000 8
Package System 3 0 0 0 200 0 0 75 200 90000 22500 8
Comm.  Package System 1  0 0 0 0 300 0 50 0 80000 20000 8
Package Package System 2 0 0 0 0 400 0 75 0 90000 22500 8
Package System 3 0 0 0 0 450 0 100 0 100000 25000 6
Package System 4 0 0 0 0 500 0 150 0 100000 25000 6
Package System 5 0 0 0 0 550 0 200 0 110000 27500 6
Power  Package System 1  0 0 0 0 0 350 0 0 80000 20000 8
Package Package System 2 0 0 0 0 0 450 0 0 90000 22500 8
Package System 3 0 0 0 0 0 550 0 0 100000 25000 7
Package System 4 0 0 0 0 0 650 0 0 110000 27500 7
Package System 5 0 0 0 0 0 750 0 0 120000 30000 6
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
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early stages, but rather in the best valued TRL systems that can potentially improve the 
overall portfolio index at later stages. The “exploration” element of researching lower TRL 
technologies with potentially higher payoffs is seen in the decision to research such systems 
in Table 3. For example, at Y = 1.0, the decision to acquire an ASW system is left to the 
latter stage at the second decision epoch, after ASW Prototype 2 has been researched and 
reached a TRL of 8 for subsequent acquisition. At the lower level of preference, Y = 0.1, we 
observe that the policy favours the immediate acquisition of TRL>8 systems for short term 
gains.  
An acquisitions practitioner could conceivably use sequential results to select an 
appropriate policy of ϒ, based on practitioner insights into the acquisition environment. 
Additionally, the optimization framework addresses the combinatorial aspects of the systems 
interconnectivities, accounts of acquisition sequencing and maximizes the potential utility of 
yet-to-be introduced systems by evaluating potential value to the overall architecture, based 
on investment research progress towards TRL 8 status.  




Gamma Value 1 0.1 1 0.1 1 0.1 1 0.1 1 0.1 1 0.1
System
ASW Variable Depth 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
Multi Fcn Tow 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lightweight tow 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ASW Prototype 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ASW Prototype 2 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
MCM RAMCS II 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
ALMDS (MH‐60) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MCM Prototype 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MCM Prototype 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MCM Prototype 3 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
SUW N‐LOS Missiles 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Griffin Missiles 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SUW Prototype  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SUW Prototype  2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SUW Prototype  3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
nconvention Package System 1  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Warfare Package System 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Package System 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Comm.  Package System 1  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Package Package System 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Package System 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Package System 4 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
Package System 5 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
Power  Package System 1  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Package Package System 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Package System 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Package System 4 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
Package System 5 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
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Table 3. Decision Epochs Research (࢞ࢗ,࢚ࡾ ) 
 
Conclusions and Summary 
The management of acquisitions of highly interdependent systems, is a difficult 
endeavor due to complex combinatorial interdependencies and uncertainties between 
current and yet-to-be introduced systems. Research in this paper complements prior work in 
robust portfolio approaches to managing defense acquisitions, by providing a framework 
towards managing dynamically evolving acquisitions decisions in environments with 
dynamically constrained costs and schedules. The framework is based on multi-period 
dynamic programming techniques, is intuitive in nature, and it has shown promise in 
assisting practitioners in evolving acquisitions. The framework can account for sequential 
research of new, yet-to-be introduced systems, and evaluate acquisitions of existing 
systems within a dynamic and quantitatively objective framework. Future work can 
potentially expand the current dynamic framework by introducing algorithmic innovations in 
statistically evaluating the correlated properties of potential investments of value (say 
correlation in research funded tasks), as a means of improving the forward programming 
efficiency of the multi-period portfolio framework. 
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